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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 We are asked to decide whether there is a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest that prohibits the 
State from continuing to house inmates in solitary 
confinement1 on death row after they have been granted 
resentencing hearings, without meaningful review of the 
continuing placement.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
conclude that there is and that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment therefore limits the State’s ability to 
subject an inmate to the deprivations of death row once the 
death sentence initially relied upon to justify such extreme 
                                              
1 This level of confinement is also sometimes referred to as 
“administrative segregation.” 
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restrictions is no longer operative.2  However, we also hold 
that, because this principle was not clearly established before 
today, the prison officials (“Defendants”) in this consolidated 
appeal are entitled to qualified immunity.   
 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the district courts’ grants 
of summary judgment in favor of Defendants based on 
qualified immunity.  In reaching this conclusion, we stress 
that this liberty interest, as explained more fully below, is 
now clearly established. 
 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 Craig Williams and Shawn T. Walker (“Plaintiffs”)3 
are inmates in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections (“DOC”).  Each was sentenced to death and 
housed on the death row of his respective institution 
following imposition of his death sentence.  Eventually, their 
death sentences were vacated, but several years elapsed 
before they were resentenced to life without parole.4  In the 
                                              
2 Plaintiffs have both had their death sentences vacated but 
were nevertheless detained in solitary confinement on death 
row.  We take no position on whether any inherent risk posed 
by inmates whose death sentences are still active and viable is 
sufficient to raise a presumption that their continued 
confinement on death row is justifiable. 
3 This Court consolidated Williams’s and Walkers’ appeals.  
We thank James J. Bilsborrow, Esq., appointed counsel, for 
his pro bono representation of Plaintiffs in this matter. 
4 “Vacated” as used throughout this opinion refers to 
situations where a defendant has initially been sentenced to 
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interim, Plaintiffs were kept on death row until their appeals 
were finally decided.  Accordingly, they spent several years 
in the solitary confinement of death row from the date their 
death sentences were vacated, until they were finally 
resentenced to life imprisonment and placed in the general 
population.5   
 
 After their sentences were vacated, each Plaintiff 
brought suit seeking damages6 from various DOC officials.7  
                                                                                                     
death, but has subsequently been granted a new sentencing 
hearing.  
5 As defined by DOC policy, the “general population” is a 
“status of confinement for an inmate who is not in 
Administrative or Disciplinary Custody or other type of 
special housing.”  DC-ADM 802, Administrative Custody 
Procedures, JA at 94 ¶E. 
6 Walker sued Defendants in their individual capacities.  He 
initially sought injunctive and declaratory relief in addition to 
damages.  His transfer from death row mooted all but his 
damages claim.  See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“An inmate’s transfer from the 
facility complained of generally moots the equitable and 
declaratory claims.”). 
7 Williams sued Defendants in their individual and official 
capacities.  He filed suit against John Wetzel, Secretary 
Pennsylvania DOC; Dorina Varner, Chief Grievance 
Coordinator; Tina Friday, Records Officer; Jeffrey R. Rogers, 
Program Manager; Tracy Shawley, Grievance Coordinator; 
and Louis N. Folino, Superintendent.  Walker filed suit 
against Michael A. Farnan, Chief Counsel; Jeffrey A. Beard, 
Secretary Pennsylvania DOC; David DiGuglielmo, 
 
7 
 
Their suits allege the officials violated their Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to due process by continuing to subject 
them to the deprivations of solitary confinement on death row 
without meaningful review of their placements after their 
death sentences had been vacated.8 Inasmuch as the claimed 
liberty interest turns on the conditions of Plaintiffs’ 
confinement, we will first describe those conditions and the 
legal authority relied upon to impose it, and then address 
whether those conditions violate a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest.   
 
A. Confinement on Death Row 
 
 Plaintiffs were placed on death row after receiving 
their death sentences pursuant to 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4303, 
which provides:  
[T]he secretary [of corrections] 
shall, until infliction of the death 
penalty . . . keep the inmate in 
solitary confinement. During the 
confinement, no person shall be 
allowed to have access to the 
inmate without an order of the 
sentencing court, except the 
following: 
(1) The staff of the department. 
                                                                                                     
Superintendent; and Cindy G. Watson, Chief Grievance 
Officer.  
8 Plaintiffs also initially asserted substantive due process and 
Eighth Amendment claims against the DOC that they do not 
pursue on appeal.  
8 
 
(2) The inmate’s counsel of 
record or other attorney requested 
by the inmate. 
(3) A spiritual adviser selected by 
the inmate or the members of the 
immediate family of the inmate.9 
 
Plaintiffs assert that this provision no longer applied to them 
once their death sentences were vacated.  They further stress 
that they did not receive meaningful review of their 
continuing placement on death row to determine if the 
deprivations of that placement were necessary.   
  
 In total, Walker spent approximately twenty years on 
death row.  Roughly eight of those years were spent after he 
had been granted a resentencing hearing.10  Williams spent 
twenty-two years on death row, with six of those years 
following his grant of resentencing.11   
 
1. Walker 
 
After his death sentence was vacated, Walker 
remained on death row where he was confined in a 
windowless seven by twelve feet cell for almost twenty-four 
hours a day.  There, like other death row inmates at SCI-
Graterford, he lost “virtually all communication [with] the 
                                              
9 61 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 4303, formerly codified at § 
3003. 
10 Walker v. Farnan, No. CIV. A. 07-4977, 2015 WL 390424, 
at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2015).  
11 Plaintiffs Br. at 4-6. 
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general population and the outside world.”12  Walker was 
permitted four (non-legal) visits per month.  During those 
visits he was “locked in a closet-sized room, behind a 
reinforced sheet of glass . . . . [and was] not permitted 
physical contact with any of his visitors . . . .”13  Even 
Walker’s meals were provided in the isolation of his cell.  
 
Walker was permitted to leave his cell only five times 
a week for two-hour intervals of exercise in the open air, in a 
restricted area known as the “dog cage.”14  However, to enter 
the “dog cage,” Walker first had to undergo an invasive strip 
search.15  To avoid the psychological and physical intrusion 
of these “full” body searches, Walker did not leave his cell 
for open air exercise for nearly seven years.16  
 
Walker alleges that his prolonged confinement on 
death row in these constricting conditions has taken a toll on 
his mental and physical well-being.  He describes these 
                                              
12 JA at 193 ¶36. 
13 Id. at 195 ¶60. 
14 Id. at 193-94 ¶47. 
15 The precise nature of the strip searches Walker was 
subjected to is not evident in the record.  Correctional facility 
strip searches have been described elsewhere as requiring an 
inmate to “lift and shake his genitalia, . . . bend over, spread 
his buttocks in the direction of the officer so that he may look 
at [the inmate’s] anus, then made to squat and cough, and 
afterwards [the inmate is] hand cuffed behind his back[.]”  
Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 522 (4th Cir. 2015), as 
amended (July 7, 2015). 
16 JA at 193-94, 283 ¶6. 
10 
 
effects as “long term and debilitating.”17  For example, due to 
the constant noise of other inmates on death row, and a “fear 
of being executed accidentally,” Walker developed 
insomnia.18  He also claims to suffer from uncontrollable 
body tremors and severe emotional distress. 
 
2. Williams 
 
Williams’s plight on death row at SCI-Greene was 
similar to Walker’s.  He remained confined to his cell for 
almost twenty-two hours a day after his death sentence was 
vacated.  His meals were also provided in the confines of his 
cell.  Williams explains that because medical consultations 
were provided at his cell door, inmates in separate cells could 
hear his exchanges with medical providers, which 
compromised his privacy.  During the short intervals that 
Williams was not in his cell, but in the prison yard, law 
library, or shower, he was held inside a small locked cage that 
continued to restrict his movement and freedom of 
association.  Like Walker, he was only permitted non-contact 
visits.   
 
B. Plaintiffs’ Legal Proceedings 
 
 Plaintiffs filed numerous prison grievances based on 
continually being subjected to these deprivations.  Those 
grievances were unsuccessful.  Plaintiffs then filed the suits 
that are before us in these consolidated appeals.  The 
procedural background leading to these suits is as follows. 
                                              
17 Id. at 195-96 ¶64. 
18 Id. at 194 ¶51. 
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1. Williams 
 
 In 1988, Williams was convicted of first degree 
murder in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas and was 
later sentenced to death.  Williams’s criminal judgment was 
affirmed on direct appeal.19  Williams then pursued relief 
under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act 
(“PCRA”).20  On July 11, 2006, the trial court concluded that 
Williams was entitled to a new penalty hearing.  Williams 
appealed the court’s denial of his guilt phase claims, but the 
State did not appeal the court’s invalidation of the death 
sentence that was imposed at the sentencing phase.  On May 
1, 2012, Williams was resentenced to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.  Soon thereafter, he was 
finally removed from death row at SCI-Greene and placed in 
the general population.21  
  
 In July of 2012, Williams filed a pro se and in forma 
pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various DOC 
officials.  He alleged that his confinement on death row 
between the time that he was granted resentencing and the 
time his new sentence was imposed violated his substantive 
and procedural due process rights.  Defendants moved for 
summary judgment, contending that Williams’s confinement 
while awaiting resentencing did not violate his constitutional 
                                              
19 Commonwealth v. Williams, 615 A.2d 716 (Pa. 1992).   
20 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq.  
21 Williams did not challenge the delay between his 
resentencing, which took place in May, and his transfer into 
the general population, which took place in September. 
12 
 
rights.  Defendants also argued that they were entitled to 
qualified immunity, a defense they had raised earlier in their 
answer to Williams’s complaint.  In a Report and 
Recommendation, the assigned Magistrate Judge concluded 
that Williams’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due 
process claim failed because he did not have a liberty interest 
in being housed in the general prison population.22 The 
Magistrate Judge also concluded that because Defendants’ 
policy of keeping inmates like Williams on death row even 
after their death sentences were vacated was grounded in 
legitimate penological goals, Williams did not have a 
substantive due process claim. 23  Overruling Williams’s 
objections, the district court adopted the Report and 
Recommendation and granted Defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment.24  Williams appealed. 
 
2. Walker 
 
Walker was also convicted of first degree murder in 
the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas in 1992, and 
sentenced to death.  The verdict and sentence were affirmed 
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on direct appeal.25  
Walker thereafter filed for relief under the PCRA.  In April 
2004, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas upheld his 
conviction but granted a new sentencing hearing.  After 
                                              
22 Williams v. Wetzel, No. CIV. A. 12-944, 2014 WL 252020, 
at *5 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2014).  The district court adopted a 
magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation.   
23 Id. at *7-9. 
24 Id. at *1. 
25 Commonwealth v. Walker, 656 A.2d 90 (Pa. 1995).   
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additional unsuccessful challenges to his conviction, Walker 
was resentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole on April 12, 2012,26 and transferred to the general 
population on May 4, 2012.27 
 
 Before his resentencing, in 2008 Walker filed a pro se 
and in forma pauperis § 1983 action alleging that his 
confinement on death row after his death sentence had been 
vacated violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from 
cruel and unusual punishment as well as his Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process of law.28  Pro bono counsel 
was appointed to represent Walker.  The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Defendants.29 The court 
concluded that Defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity because the rights Walker asserted were not clearly 
established.30  Walker’s appeal from that ruling was 
consolidated with Williams’s appeal. 
C. DOC Policy 
 Defendants argue that the DOC policy that implements 
§ 4303 required Plaintiffs’ continued confinement on death 
row until they were resentenced to life imprisonment.  In 
relevant part, this policy states: 
S. Modification of Sentence 
 
                                              
26 JA at 218. 
27 Id. at 287. 
28 Walker initially filed suit pro se and in forma pauperis.  
The district court appointed pro bono counsel to represent 
him. 
29 Walker, No. CIV. A. 07-4977, 2015 WL 390424, at *1. 
30 Id. at *4. 
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1. In the event that an order is 
received modifying the sentence 
of a Capital Case inmate to life 
imprisonment due to a re-
sentencing proceeding held as the 
result of an appeal or Post 
Conviction Relief Act, . . . the 
facility Records Supervisor must 
determine whether the order is 
valid and whether the District 
Attorney intends to appeal the 
order. 
 
2. If the District Attorney intends 
to appeal, the inmate shall not be 
moved from the Capital Case unit 
until the appeal is resolved.  
However, the inmate may be 
moved from the Capital Case 
Unit, if the District Attorney does 
not file an appeal within 30 days. 
 
3. If the District Attorney does not 
intend to appeal and if the inmate 
does not remain subject to an 
execution sentence as the result of 
a prosecution other than the 
sentence modified in the order, 
15 
 
the inmate may be moved from 
the Capital Case Unit.31 
 
 According to Defendants, this policy only permits 
removal from death row (referred to in the policy as the 
“Capital Case Unit”) when a death sentence has actually been 
modified.  They claim that the grants of resentencing here 
merely put Plaintiffs’ sentences on hold because re-
imposition of the death penalty was possible.  In any event, 
Defendants assert they are protected from Plaintiffs’ suits by 
qualified immunity.   
 
III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 The district courts had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  We exercise jurisdiction over these consolidated 
appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the 
courts’ grants of summary judgment is plenary.32  Thus, we 
must draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor.33  If 
we find there are no genuine issues of material fact, and 
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we 
must affirm the courts’ orders of summary judgment.34  
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
                                              
31 Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Capital Case 
Procedures Manual 6.5.8.1.S; JA at 91. 
32 See Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
33 See Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 218 
(3d Cir. 2015). 
34 See id. 
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 Plaintiffs maintain that their confinement on death row 
without regular placement reviews after they had been 
granted new sentencing hearings violated their procedural due 
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Accordingly, we begin with the threshold question of whether 
Plaintiffs have asserted a liberty interest sufficient to trigger 
due process protections.  If we conclude they have a liberty 
interest under the Due Process Clause, we then must decide if 
that right was clearly established when the alleged due 
process violation occurred.  If the right was not clearly 
established, our inquiry ends and Defendants are entitled to 
qualified immunity.  If it was, we then need to determine if 
there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the alleged 
violation of that right. 
 
A. Qualified Immunity 
 
 Defendants assert that qualified immunity bars 
Plaintiffs’ claims for damages and that they are therefore not 
liable even if Plaintiffs’ protracted confinement on death row 
was unconstitutional.  Under the doctrine of qualified 
immunity, “officials performing discretionary functions 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar 
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights.”35  In assessing qualified immunity 
claims, we conduct a two-part inquiry.  We first determine 
whether a right has been violated.  If it has, we then must 
decide if the right at issue was clearly established when 
                                              
35 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
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violated such that it would have been clear to a reasonable 
person that her conduct was unlawful.36   
 
As the Supreme Court made clear in Pearson v. 
Callahan, courts are no longer required to tackle these steps 
in sequential order.37  The decisions now on appeal represent 
both possible approaches. The district court that decided 
Williams’s case found that his constitutional rights had not 
been violated, albeit not in the context of a qualified 
immunity analysis.  The district court in Walker’s case 
discussed only the second prong, concluding that because the 
right Walker alleged was not clearly established, Defendants 
were entitled to summary judgment based on qualified 
immunity.38  
 
Despite relaxing the “rigid order of battle”39 that 
formerly governed the analysis of qualified immunity, in 
Pearson, the Court nonetheless recognized that it is often 
appropriate and beneficial to define the scope of a 
                                              
36 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001), overruled in 
part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
37 See Pearson, 55 U.S. at 234-36 (relaxing “the rigid order of 
battle”) (overruling Saucier, 533 U.S. 194); see also 
Werkheiser v. Pocono Twp., 780 F.3d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(“Because we do not believe the right at issue here was 
clearly established, we begin with the second step.”). 
38 Walker, No. CIV. A. 07-4977, 2015 WL 390424, at *4 
(“Even if we were to somehow conclude that there was such a 
right, it certainly was not clearly established during the period 
in question.”). 
39 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 234. 
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constitutional right.  Doing so “promotes the development of 
constitutional precedent” and is especially valuable “with 
respect to questions that do not frequently arise in cases in 
which a qualified immunity defense is unavailable.”40  The 
analytical approach is thus left to appellate courts to resolve 
in the context of the individual case, and the constitutional 
question, before it.41 
 
“Because we believe this case will clarify and 
elaborate upon our prior jurisprudence in important and 
necessary ways,” we exercise our discretion under Pearson to 
reach the qualified immunity steps in sequence.42  
Accordingly, we will first determine whether Plaintiffs’ rights 
were violated and then decide if Defendants should have 
qualified immunity from suit.  We adopt this approach for 
several reasons, not the least of which is the salience of the 
underlying questions to the ongoing societal debate about 
solitary confinement.  But at a more basic level, lawsuits by 
prisoners, whether about conditions of confinement or other 
aspects of incarceration, are frequently—and, we stress, not 
inappropriately—met with qualified immunity defenses from 
defendants.43  Thus, defining rights when given the 
                                              
40 Id. at 236.  
41 See id. 
42 Doe v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163, 169-70 (4th 
Cir. 2010). 
43 See, e.g., Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 273 (11th Cir. 
2013) (“A claim of deliberate indifference to a serious 
medical need in violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amendments necessarily arises only where the plaintiff is 
incarcerated, and a qualified immunity defense is generally 
 
19 
 
opportunity to do so not only inures to the benefit of potential 
plaintiffs, it also informs prison personnel and others about 
what is appropriate.  Those responsible for discharging the 
difficult responsibility of administering our nation’s prisons 
deserve clear statements about what the law allows.   
 
B. Protected Liberty Interest 
1. Sandin, Wilkinson, and Shoats44 
                                                                                                     
available to the public official or officials against whom the 
plaintiff brings suit.  . . . Thus, we see precious little reason to 
delay the resolution of the constitutional question until a later 
date, since any later case raising this question will almost 
surely be decided in the same context of qualified 
immunity.”).   
44 Both Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ appellate briefs focus on 
these and similar cases, and specifically the “atypical and 
significant hardship” standard from Sandin and its discussion 
of state-created liberty interests.  However, our cases hold 
that prisoners whose sentences have been vacated, and who 
have not yet been resentenced, are treated as pretrial detainees 
for purposes of constitutional inquiry, even if their criminal 
conviction has not been reversed.  See Stevenson v. Carroll, 
495 F.3d 62, 67 (3d Cir. 2007).  “Unlike sentenced prisoners, 
who . . . must look to state law for the protection of their 
personal liberties, pre-trial detainees have liberty interests 
firmly grounded in federal constitutional law.”  Fuentes v. 
Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 341 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Cobb v. 
Aytch, 643 F.2d 946, 957 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc)).  In 
Carroll, as here, the “[institution did] not contest the status of 
the appellants as pretrial detainees . . . .” Carroll at 67.   
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 A liberty interest may arise from the Constitution or 
“from an expectation or interest created by state laws.”45  
Here, Plaintiffs contend they had a state-created liberty 
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.  To establish such 
an interest in the conditions of confinement context, courts 
generally require a showing that the alleged liberty interest is 
substantial.46  To rise to the level of a liberty interest, the right 
                                                                                                     
 Moreover, we have emphasized that Sandin, which 
concerned the due process rights of a sentenced prisoner, does 
not apply in the pretrial-detainee context.  Fuentes, 206 F.3d 
at 342 n.9; see also Dilworth v. Adams, 841 F.3d 246, 252 
(4th Cir. 2016) (“Every federal court of appeals to consider 
the question has concluded that Sandin’s ‘atypical and 
significant hardship’ standard does not govern the procedural 
due process claims of pretrial detainees.”); Bistrian v. Levi, 
696 F.3d 352, 372-73 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing the different 
due process standards).   
  
 We will nevertheless use the Sandin framework here, 
as both parties suggest.  The standards applicable to 
sentenced inmates provide a floor for treatment of pretrial 
detainees, who are generally entitled to greater comparative 
freedom from unconstitutional punishments and deprivations 
of process.  See Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 375.  Moreover, since 
we find, as explained below, that Plaintiffs prevail in part 
even under the more demanding Sandin analysis, we would 
reach the same result even under the standard we set forth in 
the Fuentes and Stevenson line of cases.  
45 Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). 
46 We are not persuaded by Defendants’ attempt to insert a 
second criterion, namely, that a “state-created” interest must 
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alleged must confer “freedom from restraint which . . . 
imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in 
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”47   
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Sandin v. Conner48 
and Wilkinson v. Austin49 guide our inquiry into what 
                                                                                                     
be formalized through law or policy.  It is clear under Sandin 
v. Conner that we must consider the extent of the hardship, 
not whether the State has expressly written the right into law 
or policy.  515 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1995) (“[E]ncourag[ing] 
prisoners to comb regulations in search of mandatory 
language . . . creates disincentives for States to codify prison 
management procedures . . . [to] avoid creation of ‘liberty’ 
interests.”); see also Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (“In [Sandin], the Supreme Court announced a new 
standard for determining whether prison conditions deprive a 
prisoner of a liberty interest that is protected by procedural 
due process guarantees.”); Parker v. Cook, 642 F.2d 865, 867 
(5th Cir. 1981) (“Since states rarely if ever explicitly label 
their creations as ‘liberty interests,’ we must look to the 
substance of the state action to determine whether a liberty 
interest has been created.  And whether this substance is 
embodied in a constitution, statute, regulation, rule, or 
practice is of no significance.”).  Indeed, a contrary result 
would allow states to impose any level of extreme 
deprivations and escape remediation under the Due Process 
Clause by simply not writing the countervailing liberty 
interest into law or incorporating it into pronounced policy. 
47 Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). 
48 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 
49 545 U.S. 209 (2005). 
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constitutes an “atypical and significant” hardship.  In 1995, 
the Court held in Sandin that no liberty interest was 
implicated by an inmate’s placement in solitary confinement 
for thirty days as discipline for disruptive behavior.50  The 
holding was based on the Court’s conclusion that disciplinary 
solitary confinement was “within the expected perimeters of 
the sentence imposed” and therefore, was not atypical.51  A 
decade later, in Wilkinson, the Court held that conditions at a 
“Supermax” facility were such a severely constricting 
environment that they gave rise to a state-created liberty 
interest.52  The Court explained, “Supermax facilities are 
maximum-security prisons with highly restrictive conditions, 
designed to segregate the most dangerous prisoners from the 
general prison population.”53  The Court concluded that long-
term incarceration in the Supermax at issue was “synonymous 
with extreme isolation.”54  Consequently, the Court held that 
the challenged conditions of confinement were atypical 
“under any plausible baseline.”55  The inmates therefore had a 
                                              
50 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 (“We hold that Conner’s discipline 
in segregated confinement did not present the type of 
atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might 
conceivably create a liberty interest.”). 
51 Id. at 485. 
52 Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223-24. 
53 Id. at 213. 
54 Id. at 214. 
55 Id. at 223.  In coming to this conclusion, the Wilkinson 
Court also considered the fact that placement in this 
Supermax facility disqualified an otherwise eligible inmate 
for parole consideration.  Id. at 224.  Contrary to Defendants’ 
assertions, we need not consider the absence of this factor 
 
23 
 
liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause in not being subjected to these conditions 
absent procedural protections that ensured the confinement 
was appropriate.56 
 
As Wilkinson recognized, “[i]n Sandin’s wake the 
Courts of Appeals have not reached consistent conclusions 
for identifying the baseline from which to measure what is 
atypical and significant.”57  Given Wilkinson’s guidance, in 
Shoats v. Horn we established the following two-factor 
inquiry:  (1) the duration of the challenged conditions; and (2) 
whether the conditions overall imposed a significant hardship 
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.58  Applying 
that inquiry in Shoats, we concluded that “virtual isolation for 
almost eight years” in solitary confinement created a 
protected liberty interest.59  
 
                                                                                                     
here.  Parole was not Plaintiffs’ to lose.  In any event, this 
consideration was not essential to the Court’s finding of a 
protected interest in Wilkinson.  See Westefer v. Snyder, 422 
F.3d 570, 590 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Illinois’ contention that the 
liberty interest identified in Wilkinson turned exclusively on 
the absence of parole constitutes, [in] our view, far too 
crabbed a reading of the decision.”). 
56 Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224. 
57 Id. at 223. 
58 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Powell v. Weiss, 
757 F.3d 338, 346 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that Shoats is this 
court’s governing standard). 
59 Shoats, 213 F.3d at 144. 
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Shoats involved a suit by an inmate confined in 
administrative custody because of his history of violence.60  
The inmate was serving a life sentence for murder when he 
escaped from custody.61  During the escape, Shoats stabbed 
several guards.62  Given his violent behavior and the 
perceived threat to others, Shoats was placed in 
administrative custody when finally recaptured.  Under then 
existing prison policy, “there [was] no maximum period of 
confinement in administrative custody.”63  Rather, release 
back to the general population was dependent on “an 
evaluation of many factors.”64  These included behavior while 
in administrative custody, “continued risk, safety of others, 
and recommendations of prison personnel, including 
treatment staff.”65  
 
  In discussing Shoats’ claim that indefinite detention in 
administrative custody violated his right to due process, we 
described what administrative custody involved.  
Administrative custody meant that inmates were “not allowed 
to have radios, televisions, telephone calls (except emergency 
or legal), personal property except writing materials, or books 
other than legal materials and a personal religious volume.”66  
“Non-legal visits [were limited to] one per week . . . under 
appropriate security procedures designated by the [prison’s] 
                                              
60 Id. at 142-43. 
61 Id. at 141. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 142. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  
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Program Review Committee (PRC).”67  Finally, inmates in 
administrative custody were not eligible to participate in any 
educational programs “and all meals [had to be] eaten in the 
inmates’ cells.”68  We concluded that these deprivations were 
such a significant departure from the hardships normally 
attendant to incarceration that Shoats had a liberty interest in 
not being made to endure them indefinitely.69 
 
2. Plaintiffs’ Atypical Hardship 
a. Duration of Segregation 
Plaintiffs have shown atypical hardship.  In Sandin, the 
Court found that thirty days in solitary confinement did not 
give rise to a protected interest.70  In Wilkinson, the Court 
found that essentially indefinite confinement with the extreme 
deprivations imposed there did give rise to a protected 
interest.71  The hardship Plaintiffs experienced here is far 
more analogous to the extreme deprivation in Wilkinson than 
the much shorter and less severe infringement on liberty that 
was present in Sandin.  Both Plaintiffs remained in solitary 
confinement on death row for years—many multiples of 
Sandin’s thirty days—after the initial justification for 
subjecting them to such extreme deprivation (their death 
sentences) ceased to exist.72  Plaintiffs’ isolation on death row 
                                              
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 144. 
70 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87. 
71 Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224. 
72 Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs are responsible for the 
length of these periods of confinement because they initiated 
prolonged appeals of their convictions is both meritless and 
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lasted six and eight years.  We see no meaningful distinction 
between those periods of extreme deprivation and the eight 
years of solitary confinement that we concluded in Shoats 
was “not only atypical, but [] indeed ‘unique.’”73  Although 
we do not suggest that it would be considered atypical under 
Sandin, we do note that researchers have found that even a 
few days in solitary confinement can cause cognitive 
disturbances.74 
 
Here, as in Wilkinson and Shoats, Plaintiffs’ 
placements on death row were indefinite.75  In Wilkinson, 
“placement at [the Supermax] is for an indefinite period of 
time, limited only by an inmate’s sentence.  For an inmate 
serving a life sentence, there is no indication how long he 
                                                                                                     
disappointing.  Plaintiffs’ exercise of their rights to appellate 
review is simply irrelevant to our assessment of the 
constitutionality of their conditions of confinement. 
73 Shoats, 213 F.3d at 144 (noting also that the DOC “would 
be concerned about the psychological damage to an inmate 
after only 90 days of such confinement and would generally 
recommend transfer to the general population after 90 days as 
a consequence”) (emphasis in original); see also Wilkerson v. 
Goodwin, 774 F.3d 845, 855 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he duration 
in segregated confinement that courts have found does not 
give rise to a liberty interest ranges up to two and one-half 
years.”). 
74 Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary 
Confinement, 22 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 325, 331 (2006) 
[hereinafter Grassian]. 
75 See JA at 192 ¶31 (“Walker’s solitary confinement is 
indefinite.”) (emphasis added). 
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may be incarcerated . . . once assigned there.”76  And in 
Shoats, we found the deprivations were indefinite because 
there was no maximum period for the inmate’s placement in 
solitary confinement.77  Likewise, Plaintiffs’ continued 
confinement on death row after their death sentences were 
vacated continued for years with no ascertainable date for 
their release into the general population.  Plaintiffs could not 
even hope to be released based on prison PRC review because 
these pro forma assessments did not consider the necessity of 
their severe conditions of confinement.  Obviously, had 
Plaintiffs’ respective appellate proceedings stretched far 
beyond six and eight years, so would their respective 
placements on death row.  Indeed, Defendants argue this is 
precisely what the DOC policy would have required.  In 
Defendants’ view, so long as re-imposition of the death 
penalty was possible, the automatic deprivations of death row 
were mandatory.   
 
This indefiniteness contrasts sharply with other 
common forms of solitary confinement, such as the punitive 
segregation that is discussed in Sandin.78  The duration of the 
deprivations that follow from that seclusion is often 
predetermined and fixed79 unless the inmate’s behavior is 
thought to require an additional period of segregation.80  
                                              
76 Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 214-15. 
77 Shoats, 213 F.3d at 142, 144. 
78 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 475-76, 485-86. 
79 See, e.g., id. at 475-76 (noting that prior to the inmate’s 
placement in solitary confinement, he was sentenced to a term 
of thirty days of administrative segregation). 
80 See JA at 251, 18:5-13.   
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Here, Walker and Williams could have been the most 
compliant inmates in a given facility, and exhibited no signs 
they would endanger themselves or others.  They would still 
have been relegated to death row indefinitely even though 
they had won new sentencing proceedings and were not under 
active sentences of death.  This would follow even if the 
professionals who are part of the prison PRC reviewed their 
placements and concluded that that level of confinement was 
not otherwise warranted.  We therefore have no trouble 
holding that the conditions they had to endure while awaiting 
resentencing constitute an “atypical . . . hardship on the 
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”81  
 
b. Plaintiffs’ Significant Hardship 
 
As in Shoats, it is undisputed that the conditions 
Plaintiffs experienced on death row “differ significantly from 
‘routine’ prison conditions in Pennsylvania state 
institutions.”82  Among the range of hardships we have 
already noted, Plaintiffs were confined to their respective 
cells for twenty-two to twenty-four hours a day and ate all 
meals accompanied only by the emptiness within the walls of 
their cells.  In addition, Williams was placed inside a small 
locked cage during much of the limited time he was allowed 
to leave his cell and Walker was subjected to invasive strip 
searches each time he left his cell for exercise.  As discussed 
below, a body of research has shown that such conditions can 
                                              
81 Griffin, 112 F.3d at 708 (emphasis added) (quoting Sandin, 
515 U.S. at 484).  
82 Shoats, 213 F.3d at 144. 
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trigger devastating psychological consequences, including a 
loss of a sense of self.83 
 
These are also stark departures from conditions in the 
general prison population, and Defendants readily concede as 
much:  “Regarding the comparison of conditions of 
confinement for capital case inmates with those [in the] 
general population, it is admitted that they are more strict than 
those for general population.”84  The record establishes that, 
unlike those confined on death row, inmates in the general 
population have:  Access to open air activities without strip 
searches; regular access to windows and natural light; daily 
access to showers; and the right to more frequent visits where 
contact is permitted.  General population inmates also have 
access to group religious services, while death row inmates 
are limited to religious tapes.  A variety of jobs and 
vocational programs—including clothing factory jobs, 
culinary training, and barbershop training—are limited to 
inmates in the general population.  Likewise, group sport 
activities are reserved for the general population.  General 
population inmates can make phone calls as frequently as 
their funds allow.  On death row, outside of attorney calls, 
only three fifteen minute calls are allowed per week. 
 
The district court that ruled on Walker’s claim 
recognized these discrepancies.  The court stated in no 
uncertain terms that “[t]he conditions of confinement [on 
death row] are much more restrictive than in the general 
                                              
83 See infra notes 144-171. 
84 JA at 63 ¶13; see also JA at 176 ¶9. 
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population at Graterford.”85  For instance, “Plaintiff’s contact 
with individuals other than prison staff was extremely limited 
[on death row].  Plaintiff received each of his three meals per 
day in his cell.  By contrast, the general population at 
Graterford eats in communal dining rooms.”86  Thus, while 
general population affords inmates regular human contact, 
inmates on death row such as Plaintiffs are deprived of such 
interaction.  Even the most basic activities of daily living, 
such as eating, are done in utter solitude.   
 
Numerous studies on the impact of solitary 
confinement show that these conditions are extremely 
hazardous to well-being.  Accordingly, it is precisely this type 
of isolation that led the courts in Shoats and Wilkinson to 
conclude that the deprivations of solitary confinement 
implicate a protected liberty interest.  In Shoats, we gave 
great weight to the fact that the inmate was “confined in his 
cell for 23 hours a day, five days a week, and 24 hours a day, 
two days a week . . . . [and] eats meals by himself.”87  
Similarly, in Wilkinson the Supreme Court grounded a liberty 
interest on its finding that “[i]nmates must remain in their 
cells, which measure 7 by 14 feet, for 23 hours per day” and 
“[a]ll meals are taken alone in the inmate’s cell instead of in a 
common eating area.”88  These conditions of extreme social 
isolation cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the 
deprivations suffered by Plaintiffs here.   
  
                                              
85 Walker, No. CIV. A. 07-4977, 2015 WL 390424, at *1.  
86 Id. 
87 Shoats, 213 F.3d at 144. 
88 Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 214. 
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 In fact, in some respects, Plaintiffs’ conditions were 
more severe than those the Supreme Court found atypical and 
significant under “any plausible baseline.”89  Walker’s cell 
was even smaller than the cells in Wilkinson,90 and the 
inmates in Wilkinson were not subject to invasive strip 
searches when they left their cells.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs 
have sufficiently alleged the significant and atypical 
conditions of confinement that give rise to a protected liberty 
interest. 
  3. Defendants’ Alternate Standard 
 Defendants assert that the appropriate standard in this 
case is not the general prison population as in Wilkinson and 
Shoats.  Instead, they claim the metric we should use is the 
conditions imposed on “inmates serving similar sentences” or 
what Plaintiffs’ convictions have “authorized the State to 
impose.”91  Defendants thus claim the baseline of comparison 
here is death row itself92 because Plaintiffs remain eligible for 
the death penalty.93  Therefore, Defendants argue that 
                                              
89 Id. at 223 (emphasis added). 
90 The size of Williams’s death row cell is not apparent in the 
record. 
91 Defendants Br. at 26. 
92 Defendants also suggest the comparator is conditions in 
general (non-death row) solitary confinement.  This standard 
is untenable.  It assumes, with no factual basis, that if 
Plaintiffs had been removed from death row earlier, they 
would necessarily have been placed in general solitary 
confinement as opposed to the general prison population. 
93 Id. (“It is enough to say that, for these prisoners, 
confinement on death row is not a ‘departure’ from the 
baseline, it is the baseline.”) (emphasis in original).  We note 
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Plaintiffs’ continued confinement on death row can hardly be 
atypical.   
 
This argument fails for at least two reasons.  First, the 
standard Defendants propose is inconsistent with Shoats.  
There, we did not limit our focus to the conditions of solitary 
confinement, even though the DOC might think it appropriate 
to subject inmates evidencing violent tendencies such as 
Shoats’ to that level of deprivation.  Rather, we judged 
Shoats’ conditions “in relation to the ordinary incidents of 
prison life” or relative to “‘routine’ prison conditions.”94  The 
terms “ordinary” and “routine” direct us to use a general 
metric (the general population), not one specific to a 
particular inmate.  Second, though some courts have used the 
                                                                                                     
that in some jurisdictions, though to our knowledge 
Pennsylvania is not among them, even inmates with active 
death sentences are not always confined on death row—some 
are housed in the general population.  See Arthur Liman Pub. 
Interest Program & Ass’n of St. Corr. Admin., Time-In-Cell:  
The ASCA-Liman 2014 National Survey of Administrative 
Segregation in Prison (Aug. 2015), 52-53, 
https://www.law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/liman/docu
ment/asca-liman_administrativesegregationreport.pdf 
[hereinafter Time-in-Cell]; Mark D. Cunningham & Mark P. 
Vigen, Death Row Inmate Characteristics, Adjustment, and 
Confinement:  A Critical Review of the Literature, 20 Behav. 
Sci. & L. 191, 205 (2002); George Lombardi et al., 
Mainstreaming Death-Sentenced Inmates:  The Missouri 
Experience and its Legal Significance, 61 Fed. Prob. 3, 5 
(1997). 
94 Shoats, 213 F.3d at 144 (emphases added). 
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metric Defendants propose, it is unworkable in this context.95  
We cannot resolve Plaintiffs’ claims by reference to “inmates 
serving similar sentences” because, during the period at issue, 
Plaintiffs were not serving any sentence whatsoever.  Their 
sentences had been vacated and resentencing had been 
ordered. 
 
 Defendants’ other metric—what the State is authorized 
to impose—is based on a similarly mistaken premise.  As we 
just explained, it is inconsistent with the analysis in both 
Wilkinson and Shoats.  It also assumes that what the State is 
“authorized” to impose is determinative of our constitutional 
inquiry.  However, whether Defendants were complying with 
DOC policy is irrelevant to our liberty interest analysis.  As 
Plaintiffs point out, in Shoats, the DOC was following its own 
policy in providing Shoats with regular reviews and hearings 
regarding his placement in solitary confinement, and in 
keeping him there.96  But these policies were only relevant to 
our finding that Shoats’ due process rights had not been 
                                              
95 See, e.g., Rezaq v. Nalley, 677 F.3d 1001, 1014 (10th Cir. 
2012) (“[I]t is appropriate to compare the nature of the 
challenged conditions to the type of nonpunitive confinement 
routinely imposed on inmates serving comparable 
sentences.”); Hatch v. District of Columbia, 184 F.3d 846, 
847 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that “due process is required 
when segregative confinement imposes an ‘atypical and 
significant hardship’ on an inmate in relation to the most 
restrictive conditions that prison officials . . . routinely 
impose on inmates serving similar sentences”). 
96 Shoats, 213 F.3d at 142-43, 144-46. 
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violated.97  The DOC’s compliance with its policy did not 
stand in the way of us finding that Shoats had a liberty 
interest in avoiding solitary confinement.  We answered the 
liberty interest question based on the conditions themselves, 
as we must if the Constitution is to be our guide.98      
 
 Wilkinson likewise instructs that application of the 
DOC policy must be circumscribed by Plaintiffs’ liberty 
interest.  In Wilkinson, the Court explained that “it is clear 
that the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of a 
protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive 
conditions of confinement is not the language of regulations 
regarding those conditions but the nature of those conditions 
themselves.”99  Therefore, Defendants’ reliance on their own 
policy cannot defeat Plaintiffs’ liberty interest.  Rather, our 
inquiry must be governed by the conditions on death row. 
 
 Wilkinson also counsels against weighing inmate 
dangerousness in determining whether Defendants’ continued 
confinement of Plaintiffs on death row without meaningful 
review violated their liberty interests.  Defendants highlight 
the testimony of prison officials to claim that:  
 
                                              
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 144. 
99 Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223 (emphasis added); see also 
Parker v. Cook, 642 F.2d 865, 867 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[W]e 
must look to the substance of the state action to determine 
whether a liberty interest has been created.  And whether this 
substance is embodied in a constitution, statute, regulation, 
rule, or practice is of no significance.”).   
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prisoners whose death sentences 
have been vacated, but who are 
still liable to have the death 
penalty re-imposed, present the 
same security and safety issues as 
those who are actually under a 
death sentence . . . .  Thus, when a 
sentence of death is vacated on 
appeal or otherwise, the prisoner 
remains in a CCU until he or she 
is no longer exposed to the death 
penalty.100   
 
In Wilkinson, the Court explained:  “[H]arsh conditions may 
well be necessary and appropriate in light of the danger that 
high-risk inmates pose both to prison officials and to other 
prisoners. . . .  That necessity, however, does not diminish our 
conclusion that the conditions give rise to a liberty interest in 
their avoidance.”101  Thus, although dangerousness is 
certainly relevant to Defendants’ decisions about where to 
place inmates, it does not control the outcome of our due 
process analysis.  It is the conditions themselves that 
determine whether a liberty interest is implicated and 
                                              
100 Defendants Br. at 6.  The district court came to a similar 
conclusion in its substantive due process analysis.  It found 
the policy had a valid purpose because “[t]here is no doubt 
that an inmate in such a situation presents a heightened risk 
and threat to the safety and security of staff and other inmates 
. . . . they have ‘nothing left to lose.’”  Wetzel, No. CIV. A. 
12-944, 2014 WL 252020, at *8. 
101 Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224. 
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procedural protections must be in place to determine if the 
level of dangerousness justifies the deprivations imposed. 
 
4. The Scientific Consensus 
  
 The robust body of scientific research on the effects of 
solitary confinement, combined with the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Wilkinson and ours in Shoats, further informs our 
inquiry into Plaintiffs’ claim that they had a liberty interest in 
avoiding the extreme conditions of solitary confinement on 
death row.  This research contextualizes and confirms the 
holdings in Wilkinson and Shoats:  It is now clear that the 
deprivations of protracted solitary confinement so exceed the 
typical deprivations of imprisonment as to be the kind of 
“atypical, significant deprivation . . . which [can] create a 
liberty interest.”102 
 
A comprehensive meta-analysis of the existing 
literature on solitary confinement within and beyond the 
criminal justice setting found that “[t]he empirical record 
compels an unmistakable conclusion:  this experience is 
psychologically painful, can be traumatic and harmful, and 
puts many of those who have been subjected to it at risk of 
long-term . . . damage.”103  Specifically, based on an 
examination of a representative sample of sensory deprivation 
studies, the researchers found that virtually everyone exposed 
                                              
102 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486. 
103 Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the 
Future: A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary 
Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 477, 500 
(1997) [hereinafter Haney]. 
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to such conditions is affected in some way.104  They further 
explained that “[t]here is not a single study of solitary 
confinement wherein non-voluntary confinement that lasted 
for longer than 10 days failed to result in negative 
psychological effects.”105  And as another researcher 
elaborated, “all [individuals subjected to solitary 
confinement] will . . . experience a degree of stupor, 
difficulties with thinking and concentration, obsessional 
thinking, agitation, irritability, and difficulty tolerating 
external stimuli.”106 
 
Anxiety and panic are common side effects.107  
Depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, psychosis, 
hallucinations, paranoia, claustrophobia, and suicidal ideation 
are also frequent results.108  Additional studies included in the 
aforementioned meta-analysis further “underscored the 
importance of social contact for the creation and maintenance 
of ‘self.’”109  In other words, in the absence of interaction 
with others, an individual’s very identity is at risk of 
disintegration.   
 
In light of the severity of solitary confinement 
conditions, these troubling findings are hardly 
counterintuitive.  In one of the most comprehensive surveys 
of conditions of solitary confinement to date, researchers 
                                              
104 Id. at 500-03. 
105 Id. at 531.  
106 Grassian at 332.  
107 See Haney at 500-01. 
108 See id. at 521, 524, 530-31, 491 n.74. 
109 Id. at 503. 
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gathered detailed data from prison directors.110  They found 
that solitary confinement cells typically range from 45 to 128 
square feet111 or, in Justice Kennedy’s words, “no larger than 
a typical parking spot.”112  The researchers also learned that 
in many jurisdictions, inmates spend twenty-three hours a day 
on weekdays, and forty-eight hours straight on weekends, in 
these miniscule spaces.113  Opportunities to stay connected 
with family and friends are also limited, with some 
jurisdictions only permitting video visits and forbidding visits 
by minors.114          
 
The results of all of these studies are really neither 
surprising, nor novel.  Over one hundred years ago, well 
before the full emergence of the empirical research in this 
area, the Supreme Court recognized that solitary confinement 
caused “[a] considerable number of the prisoners [to] f[a]ll, 
after even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, 
from which it was next to impossible to arouse them, and 
others became violently insane.”115   
 
Now, with the abundance of medical and 
psychological literature, the “dehumanizing effect”116 of 
                                              
110 Time-In-Cell. 
111 Id. at ii. 
112 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208 (2015) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
113 Time-in-Cell at ii. 
114 Id. at 45. 
115 In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890). 
116 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2765 (2015) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
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solitary confinement is firmly established.  As Justice Breyer 
recognized, “it is well documented that such prolonged 
solitary confinement produces numerous deleterious 
harms.”117  A clinical review by an expert who has evaluated 
the psychiatric effects of solitary confinement in over two 
hundred inmates offers a case in point.118  This expert found 
that “disturbances were often observed in individuals who 
had no prior history of any mental illness.”119  That is to say, 
the evidence shows that the psychological trauma associated 
with solitary confinement is caused by the confinement itself.  
The relationship cannot be dismissed as merely a simple 
correlation between pre-existing mental health issues and 
placement in solitary confinement.   
 
This study also determined that even a short time in 
solitary confinement is associated with drastic cognitive 
changes:  “Indeed, even a few days of solitary confinement 
will predictably shift the electroencephalogram (EEG) pattern 
toward an abnormal pattern characteristic of stupor and 
delirium.”120  In the words of the study’s author, solitary 
confinement is “strikingly toxic to mental functioning.”121 
 
As if psychological damage was not enough, the 
impact of the deprivation does not always stop there.  
Physical harm can also result.  Studies have documented high 
                                              
117 Id.  
118 Grassian at 333. 
119 Id. at 328-29. 
120 Id. at 331. 
121 Id. at 354. 
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rates of suicide122 and self-mutilation123 amongst inmates who 
have been subjected to solitary confinement.  These behaviors 
are believed to be maladaptive mechanisms for dealing with 
the psychological suffering that comes from isolation.124  In 
addition, the lack of opportunity for free movement is 
associated with more general physical deterioration.  The 
constellations of symptoms include dangerous weight loss, 
hypertension, and heart abnormalities, as well as the 
aggravation of pre-existing medical problems.125 
 
Personal accounts of individuals subjected to solitary 
confinement are consistent with this body of research and 
                                              
122 See, e.g., Thomas B. Benjamin & Kenneth Lux, 
Constitutional and Psychological Implications of the Use of 
Solitary Confinement:  Experience at the Maine State Prison, 
9 Clearinghouse Rev. 83, 84 (1975); Lindsay M. Hayes & 
Joseph R. Rowan, National Study of Jail Suicides: Seven 
Years Later, 32-33 (1988), http://www.ncianet.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/National-Study-of-Jail-Suicides-
Seven-Years-Later-1988.pdf (finding that isolation is one of 
the key correlates of jail suicides). 
123 See, e.g., Hans Toch, Mosaic of Despair:  Human 
Breakdowns in Prison 52-53 (Revised ed., 1992); Stuart 
Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of Solitary 
Confinement, 140 Am. J. Psychiatry 1450, 1453 (1983). 
124 See Frank J. Porporino, Managing Violent Individuals in 
Correctional Settings, 1 J. Interpersonal Violence 213, 219 
(1986). 
125 See Haney at 531; Richard Korn, The Effects of 
Confinement in the High Security Unit at Lexington, 15 Soc. 
Just. 8, 16 (1988). 
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describe the devastating effects of extreme isolation and 
sensory deprivation.  One individual who spent twenty-nine 
years in solitary confinement explained, “At times I felt an 
anguish that is hard to put into words.  To live 24/7 in a box, 
year after year, without the possibility of parole, probation or 
the suspension of sentence is a terrible thing to endure.”126  
The experience drives some individuals to contemplate 
suicide.127   
 
The conclusion of another inmate paints a similar 
picture.  He described solitary confinement as capable of 
“alter[ing] the ontological makeup of a stone.”128  Given the 
research that we have discussed, that statement cannot be 
                                              
126 Robert King, Experience:  I Spent 29 Years in Solitary 
Confinement, GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2010), 
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2010/aug/28/29-
years-solitary-confinement-robert-king; see also Five Omar 
Mualimm-ak, Solitary Confinement’s Invisible Scars, 
Guardian (Oct. 30, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/30/soli
tary-confinement-invisible-scars (“Everyone knows that 
prison is supposed to take away your freedom.  But solitary 
doesn’t just confine your body; it kills your soul . . . .  Even 
now that I am out of prison, I suffer major psychological 
consequences from those years in isolation.”). 
127 Reginald Dwayne Betts, Only Once I Thought About 
Suicide, 125 Yale L.J. F. 222, 228 (2016), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/only-once-i-thought-
about-suicide. 
128 Jack Henry Abbott, In the Belly of the Beast: Letters from 
Prison 45 (1981). 
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dismissed merely because it is hyperbole.  In fact, that inmate 
eventually committed suicide in prison.129  And as we have 
just shown, his is not the only story of solitary confinement 
followed by deterioration and self-harm.  These stories 
confirm what the scores of studies130 that have examined this 
phenomenon tell us:  Continued solitary confinement, the 
experience Plaintiffs complain of here, poses a grave threat to 
well-being. 
 
This data compels us to recognize the similarities 
between the plight of Plaintiffs, and those of Shoats and the 
inmates in Wilkinson.  All were indefinitely subject to 
isolating conditions that researchers agree cause deep and 
long-term psychic harm.  Such harm is the essence of the 
atypical and significant hardship inquiry required under 
Sandin and Wilkinson. 
 
                                              
129 Prison Writer Jack H. Abbott Dies, Wash. Post (Feb. 12, 
2002), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2002/02/12/pr
ison-writer-jack-h-abbott-dies/b12e2969-a2e7-4530-bc72-
d78af089023f/.  
130 See, e.g., Henrik S. Andersen et al., A Longitudinal Study 
of Prisoners on Remand Repeated Measures of 
Psychopathology in the Initial Phase of Solitary versus 
Nonsolitary Confinement, 26 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 165, 173-
75 (2003); Terry A. Kupers, What to Do with the Survivors?  
Coping with the Long-Term Effects of Isolated Confinement, 
35 Crim. Just. & Behav. 1005, 1010 (2008); David Lovell, 
Patterns of Disturbed Behavior in a Supermax Population, 35 
Crim. Just. & Behav. 985, 997 (2008). 
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5. Purportedly Contrary Precedent Cited by Defendants 
 
 With one exception, which we shall discuss, the cases 
Defendants rely upon in arguing against Plaintiffs’ liberty 
interest are readily distinguishable.  Those cases hold that 
inmates confined under a death sentence do not have a liberty 
interest that precludes confinement on death row without 
regular review.131  However, those inmates were all confined 
pursuant to death sentences that had not been vacated.  
Accordingly, confinement on death row was not a significant 
or atypical hardship for them.  Rather, it was expressly within 
the “expected perimeters of the sentence imposed.”132  This 
logic does not apply here.  Plaintiffs were no longer being 
confined under a death sentence because their death sentences 
had been vacated.  Their liberty interests are thus not 
                                              
131 Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 252 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[A] 
court cannot conclude that death row inmates have a state-
created interest in consideration for non-solitary confinement 
when the State’s established written policy expressly 
precludes such consideration.”); Smith v. Coughlin, 748 F.2d 
783, 787 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[I]n light of [state law], which 
expressly mandated his confinement [on death row], appellant 
had no basis to claim to be the beneficiary of any state-
created liberty interest.”); Parker v. Cook, 642 F.2d 865, 874 
n.7 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Because death row inmates are never 
placed in the general population or given an expectation of 
being placed in the general population, it appears that no 
liberty interest is affected when they are placed in 
administrative segregation.”). 
132 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485. 
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comparable to those of inmates with active death sentences 
that arguably require continued placement on death row. 
 
Defendants and the district court also relied on Clark 
v. Beard.133  There, the Commonwealth Court of 
Pennsylvania examined the same policy that is at issue here 
under circumstances that were similar to those before us.  
Clark did involve inmates confined on death row without 
active death sentences.134  However, that court’s analysis does 
not advance our inquiry.  That court merely found the inmates 
failed to provide the facts necessary to establish an 
appropriate comparator for their conditions of confinement:  
“Their complaint describes the conditions in the Capital Case 
Unit, but it is devoid of any baseline against which to 
measure those conditions and determine whether they pose an 
‘atypical and significant hardship.’”135  As a result, the court 
concluded it could not determine if the inmates’ conditions 
gave rise to a liberty interest under Sandin.  Clark’s holding 
thus rested on an evidentiary determination, not a 
constitutional one rooted in the Due Process Clause.  Clark 
did not decide if the inmates had a liberty interest in being 
housed outside death row.136  Consequently, Clark simply 
does not answer the question posed here. 
                                              
133 918 A.2d 155 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 2007). 
134 Id. at 159. 
135 Id. at 162-63. 
136 Id.  As the district court noted here, “Defendants cited 
Clark as a basis for dismissal in their motion to dismiss.  We 
were not persuaded, however, observing that the 
Commonwealth Court’s affirmance in Clark was based on the 
plaintiffs’ failure to appropriately plead a cause of action-not 
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 For the reasons we have discussed, we now hold that 
Plaintiffs had a due process liberty interest in avoiding the 
extreme sensory deprivation and isolation endemic in 
confinement on death row after their death sentences had 
been vacated.137  However, as we explain below, we must 
nevertheless affirm the district courts’ grants of summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants because we conclude that 
they are entitled to qualified immunity. 
 
C. Was the Right Clearly Established? 
 
 Having found a violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional 
rights, we now determine whether the scope of the right was 
clearly established for the purposes of Defendants’ defense of 
qualified immunity.  
 
 As the district court suggested, a qualified immunity 
analysis looks through the rearview mirror, not the 
                                                                                                     
necessarily on the absence of a constitutional right to be 
housed in the general population after their death sentences 
were vacated.”  Walker, No. CIV. A. 07-4977, 2015 WL 
390424, at *4. 
137 As noted at the outset, only the district court that heard 
Williams’s case reached the due process question.  The 
district court that decided Walker’s claim ruled on qualified 
immunity alone.  Nevertheless, our conclusion regarding the 
due process right to avoid restrictive conditions of 
confinement applies equally to Walker, who was subjected to 
the same conditions under the same circumstances.  
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windshield.138  The inquiry focuses on the state of the relevant 
law when the violation allegedly occurred.  For a right to 
have been “clearly established,” “existing precedent must 
have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond 
debate.” 139  However, the facts of the existing precedent need 
not perfectly match the circumstances of the dispute in which 
the question arises.  “[O]fficials can still be on notice that 
their conduct violates established law even in novel factual 
circumstances.” 140  Requiring that precedent and subsequent 
disputes rest on identical facts would license state actors to 
violate constitutional rights with impunity simply by varying 
some irrelevant aspect of constitutional violations.  
 
 Here, although the precedent that existed when 
Defendants continued Plaintiffs’ confinement on death row 
should have suggested caution, it was not sufficient to inform 
Defendants that their conduct violated clearly established law.  
In arguing to the contrary, Plaintiffs cite Shoats for the 
proposition that an inmate’s due process right to avoid 
solitary confinement was clearly established.141  We agree 
that the interest in avoiding extreme seclusion in Shoats is 
analogous to Plaintiffs’ liberty interest even though Shoats 
did not involve confinement on death row.  As we have 
already explained, the conditions of confinement in Shoats—
indefiniteness and extreme seclusion—closely mirror those 
Plaintiffs suffered.  Thus, Shoats is consistent with, and does 
support, Plaintiffs’ claim that they had a protected liberty 
                                              
138 See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 590 (1998). 
139 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). 
140 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).   
141 Shoats, 213 F.3d 140.   
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interest.  However, we are not prepared to conclude that 
Shoats was sufficient to clearly establish Plaintiffs’ due 
process interest in avoiding confinement on death row. 
 
 Shoats was not the only relevant law in existence 
during Plaintiffs’ confinement after their sentences had been 
vacated.  Section 4303142 and its implementing policy143 
setting forth the conditions for release from death row also 
bear on whether Plaintiffs’ due process rights were clearly 
established.  Plaintiffs do not contest the legality of the statute 
or policy themselves.  Rather, Plaintiffs concede that despite 
Shoats, the policy gave Defendants reason to believe their 
actions were lawful:  “Admittedly, whether Appellants’ rights 
were ‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation is a 
difficult question.  Prison officials were following a prison 
policy that required that Appellants remain on death row until 
they were resentenced.”144 
 
  Defendants read the statute and policy as creating a 
rule that requires “prisoners like Williams and Walker, whose 
death sentences have been vacated but who are still exposed 
to the death penalty, [to] remain [on death row] until re-
sentenced to something other than death.”145  Though 
Defendants do not parse the policy, their interpretation is not 
without support.  The policy’s first criterion for removal from 
death row is “that an order is received modifying the sentence 
                                              
142 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4303. 
143 Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Capital Case 
Procedures Manual 6.5.8.1.S; JA at 91. 
144 Plaintiffs Supp. Br. at 4.    
145 Defendants Br. at 13. 
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of a Capital Case inmate to life imprisonment due to a re-
sentencing proceeding held as the result of an appeal or Post 
Conviction Relief Act, or as the result of a commutation.”146  
At the time in question, Plaintiffs’ sentences had not yet been 
modified to life without the possibility of parole.  Their 
sentences had been vacated.  Nor were their death sentences 
commuted.  Because Plaintiffs do not satisfy the first 
condition for release from death row pursuant to the policy, 
we need not reach the second two criteria.  We merely note 
that Defendants’ continued confinement of Plaintiffs on death 
row resulted from a reasonable interpretation of the policy.    
 
 In recognizing the validity of Defendants’ 
interpretation of the policy, we do not suggest that the 
profound liberty concerns raised by Plaintiffs’ continued 
confinement on death row can be overcome by a carefully 
worded prison policy.  State policy cannot undermine a 
constitutional interest.  Rather, Defendants’ policy is only 
relevant to our qualified immunity analysis because the case 
law in existence during Plaintiffs’ continued confinement on 
death row did not adequately inform Defendants that the 
policy ran counter to Plaintiffs’ protected liberty interests.  
Indeed, the limited precedent that existed on the topic 
suggested the contrary.  
 Clark, as well as the district court that decided 
Williams’s claim, read the policy and underlying statute the 
same way Defendants did.147  They concluded that these 
                                              
146 Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Capital Case 
Procedures Manual 6.5.8.1.S.1 (emphasis added); JA at 91. 
147 Wetzel, No. CIV. A. 12-944, 2014 WL 252020, at *3 
(“[P]ursuant to the aforementioned DOC policy, the 
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mandates required inmates’ continued confinement on death 
row despite the fact that their death sentences had been 
vacated.  In Clark, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania 
described the policy as establishing that “[a]n inmate 
successful in having his capital punishment replaced by 
another sentence is eligible to be discharged from custody [on 
death row].”148  Although, as we have just noted, Shoats 
should have raised concerns and counseled caution, Shoats 
does not directly dispute Clark or Defendants’ interpretation 
of the policy because Shoats was not on death row.  Thus, the 
DOC death row policy was simply not at issue there.  We 
therefore cannot say Defendants’ actions here were “plainly 
incompetent” or a “knowing[] violat[ion of] the law.”149  
 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the district courts’ grants 
of summary judgment based on qualified immunity in favor 
of all Defendants and against both Plaintiffs.  We realize that 
the court that decided Williams’s case incorrectly concluded 
that Williams did not have a protected liberty interest and 
therefore did not reach the question of qualified immunity.  
However, “[w]e may affirm a judgment on any ground 
apparent from the record, even if the district court did not 
                                                                                                     
undersigned agrees with Defendants’ position as to why 
Plaintiff was confined [on death row] during the disputed 
period of time.”); Clark, 918 A.2d at 161 (“The warrant is the 
trigger for moving an inmate to [death row], but it is not the 
key to his continued stay there.”). 
148 Clark, 918 A.2d at 164 (emphasis added). 
149 Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 616 (3d Cir. 1994) (en 
banc) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).  
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reach it.”150  Our qualified immunity analysis applies equally 
to Walker and Williams.151 
 
V. CONCLUSION: 
 
A. The Jurisprudential Shift 
Given the scientific consensus, it should come as no 
surprise that courts have recently started recognizing inmates’ 
due process right to avoid solitary confinement as clearly 
established.  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in Wilkerson v. Goodwin is illustrative.152  There, the 
record showed that the inmate had been confined to his cell 
for approximately twenty-three hours a day for nearly forty 
                                              
150 Kabakjian v. United States, 267 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 
2001).  
151 As stated earlier, Williams sued Defendants in their 
individual and official capacities. The district court did not 
have to distinguish between the two types of defendants and 
claims because it decided that there was no underlying 
constitutional violation.  Because we affirm on the second 
prong of qualified immunity, we do need to reach the 
distinction, as official-capacity defendants cannot take 
advantage of the qualified immunity defense.  See Melo v. 
Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1990).  Thus, we will 
affirm in favor of the official-capacity Defendants on the 
alternative but well-worn ground that Williams’s § 1983 
claims for money damages against the official-capacity 
Defendants were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.  
Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 (3d 
Cir. 2010). 
152 774 F.3d 845 (5th Cir. 2014). 
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years, and his rights to visitation, personal property, and 
exercise had been severely curtailed.153  Recognizing the clear 
threat to liberty such conditions pose, the court denied the 
prison officials’ assertion of qualified immunity:  “Viewed 
collectively, there can be no doubt that these conditions are 
sufficiently severe to give rise to a liberty interest under 
Sandin.  This is particularly true in light of the district court’s 
finding that [the inmate’s] solitary confinement at Wade is 
effectively indefinite.”154 
 
Speaking in nearly identical terms, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that “[w]hatever 
confusion Sandin may have left in its wake, defendants do not 
argue, nor could a credible argument be made, that it was not 
clearly established at the time of the alleged violations that . . 
. ten years of solitary confinement[] triggered due process 
protection.”155  The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth156 and 
Sixth Circuits157 have also recognized the constitutional 
                                              
153 Id. at 848-49.  
154 Id. at 856. 
155 Hanrahan v. Doling, 331 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 2003) (per 
curiam). 
156 See Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 531 (4th Cir. 2015), 
as amended (July 7, 2015) (“Appellant offered evidence 
demonstrating that conditions in [solitary confinement] are 
significantly worse than in the general population and that the 
severity, duration, and indefiniteness of his confinement 
implicate the concerns the Supreme Court identified in 
Wilkinson.”). 
157 See Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 792 (6th Cir. 
2008) (recognizing that the plaintiff, an inmate subjected to 
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implications of solitary confinement.  In Incumaa v. Stirling, 
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the 
“near-daily cavity and strip searches; the confinement to a 
small cell for all sleeping and waking hours, aside from ten 
hours of activity outside the cell per month; [and] the inability 
to socialize with other inmates” endemic to solitary 
confinement were sufficiently severe to establish a protected 
liberty interest.158  In Prieto v. Clarke, one member of that 
court went even further in a vigorous dissent, critiquing 
limitations on the due process rights of all inmates housed in 
extreme solitary confinement, even those on death row with 
active death sentences.159  
 
A recent decision by the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania is a prime example of 
the judiciary’s increasing recognition of the scientific 
evidence of the harms of solitary confinement.160  In Johnson 
                                                                                                     
solitary confinement, “has a point.  Even after a proper 
conviction and sentence, an inmate still retains a ‘liberty’ 
interest, guarded by due process, with respect to state-
imposed prison discipline that rises to the level of an ‘atypical 
and significant hardship on the inmate’” (quoting Sandin, 515 
U.S. at 484)).  
158 791 F.3d at 531. 
159 Prieto, 780 F.3d at 255-56 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (“In my 
view, the majority opinion reads Wilkinson unnecessarily 
narrowly in signing off on Prieto’s automatic, permanent, and 
unreviewable placement in the highly restrictive conditions of 
Virginia’s death row.”).  
160 We discuss this case merely to highlight its factual 
findings and strong reliance on scientific research, both of 
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v. Wetzel, the district court held that the damage of indefinite 
solitary confinement was so severe, certain, and irreparable 
that Johnson—an inmate who had been subjected to solitary 
confinement for decades—was entitled to a preliminary 
injunction requiring his transfer to the general population.161  
The district court ordered this “extraordinary remedy”162 
because Johnson, though not on death row, was subjected to 
conditions much like those Plaintiffs experienced here.  
Johnson’s “entire existence [was] restricted, for at least 
twenty-three hours per day, to an area smaller than the 
average horse stall.”163  Like Plaintiffs, Johnson was left for 
lost in the solitude of his cell walls “ad infinitum.”164  
Johnson testified about the extensive harms these conditions 
have caused him, including depression, memory loss, and 
profound hopelessness.165  A scientific expert who examined 
Johnson corroborated his symptoms, concluding that Johnson 
                                                                                                     
which are highly relevant to the issue before us.  We, of 
course, do not rely on this case as precedent, or take any 
position on the merits of the court’s decision.  
161 No. 1:16-CV-863, 2016 WL 5118149, at *12 (M.D. Pa. 
Sept. 20, 2016).  The district court grounded its preliminary 
injunction in the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment.  Id. at *6.  The district court’s 
findings on the harms of solitary confinement are pertinent to 
our procedural due process analysis, which must consider the 
significance of the conditions of confinement. 
162 Id. at *5. 
163 Id. at *1. 
164 Id. at *11. 
165 Id. at *4. 
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has “deteriorated to the point of social death as a direct result 
of his continued isolation.”166   
 
The district court found robust support for Johnson’s 
claim in academic literature.  It noted that researchers have 
observed that “psychological stressors such as isolation can 
be as clinically distressing as physical torture.”167  It also 
emphasized that it is not the only district court to have 
recognized the obviousness of the harms of solitary 
confinement.168  As another district court has explained, “that 
prolonged isolation from social and environmental 
stimulation increases the risk of developing mental illness 
does not strike this Court as rocket science.”169 
 
 In our ruling today, we now explicitly add our 
jurisprudential voice to this growing chorus.  In doing so, we 
rely, in part, upon the scientific consensus and the recent 
precedent involving non-death row solitary confinement.  
Those decisions advance our inquiry into the unique, yet 
analogous, scenario presented here.170  Inmates in solitary 
confinement on death row without active death sentences face 
the perils of extreme isolation and are at risk of erroneous 
deprivation of their liberty.  Accordingly, they have a clearly 
established due process right under the Fourteenth 
                                              
166 Id. at *8 (emphasis added). 
167 Id. at *9. 
168 Id. 
169 McClary v. Kelly, 4 F. Supp. 2d 195, 208 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 
30, 1998). 
170 As previously noted, pursuant to Pennsylvania law death 
row is solitary confinement.  61 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4303. 
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Amendment to avoid unnecessary and unexamined solitary 
confinement on death row.  The State must therefore afford 
these inmates procedural protections that ensure that 
continuing this level of deprivation is required for penological 
purposes, and is not reflexively imposed without 
individualized justification.  
 
B. Plaintiffs’ Due Process Right to Avoid  
Death Row Solitary Confinement is Now Clearly 
Established  
 
 Our holding today that Plaintiffs had a protected 
liberty interest provides “fair and clear warning”171 that, 
despite our ruling against Plaintiffs, qualified immunity will 
not bar such claims in the future.  As we have explained, 
scientific research and the evolving jurisprudence has made 
the harms of solitary confinement clear:  Mental well-being 
and one’s sense of self are at risk.172  We can think of few 
values more worthy of constitutional protection than these 
core facets of human dignity. Accordingly, we accept 
Plaintiffs’ request that “[t]his Court . . . make clear what 
prison officials should have already known:  those no longer 
                                              
171 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997). 
172 See Stuart Grassian & Nancy Friedman, Effects of Sensory 
Deprivation in Psychiatric Seclusion and Solitary 
Confinement, 8 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 49, 53 (1986) (“The 
more recent literature on this subject has also nearly 
uniformly described or speculated that solitary confinement 
has serious psychopathological consequences.”). 
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subject to the death penalty . . . have a due process right to be 
free from indefinite conditions of solitary confinement.”173 
 
C. The Required Procedural Protections 
 
 It is important to emphasize that this right to 
procedural due process protections is neither abstract nor 
symbolic, but both meaningful and required.  In Shoats, upon 
finding a protected liberty interest in avoiding solitary 
confinement, we described what we considered to be 
adequate procedural protections.  There, we granted summary 
judgment to the prison official defendants only because the 
procedures provided were sufficient to protect Shoats from 
being improperly held in solitary confinement.174  We noted 
that under the applicable DOC policy, “an inmate must 
receive written notice of the reason for his placement in 
administrative custody and he is entitled to receive a hearing 
before a PRC within six days of the initial transfer to 
administrative custody.”175  Most importantly for our 
purposes, “[e]very thirty days thereafter, inmates . . . have the 
opportunity to be personally interviewed by the PRC, which 
then determines whether the inmate should continue to be 
maintained in administrative custody.”176  That determination 
takes into account “a variety of factors including the safety of 
other inmates and staff [and] the continued public or 
institutional risk.”177  According to the DOC procedures as set 
                                              
173 Plaintiffs Supp. Br. 4. 
174 Shoats, 213 F.3d at 147. 
175 Id. at 142. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
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forth in the record before us in this case, the PRC’s decision 
may be based on evidence such as “counselor’s reports [and] 
Psychiatric/Psychological information.”178  For Shoats, we 
found that the “record reflect[ed] that the procedures called 
for did in fact occur.”179    
 
 We see no justification consistent with these Plaintiffs’ 
constitutionally protected liberty interests for subjecting them 
to the deprivations of being housed on death row after their 
death sentences were vacated with any less procedural 
protections than we held were adequate in Shoats.180    
                                              
178 JA at 116 ¶7. 
179 Shoats, 213 F.3d at 145. 
180 We note, simply to stress the importance of individualized 
placement reviews, that comparative studies examining the 
incidence of prison violence have found equivalent rates 
between death-sentenced and non-death-sentenced inmates.  
See, e.g., Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, Don’t 
Confuse Me with the Facts:  Common Errors in Violence Risk 
Assessment at Capital Sentencing, 26 Crim. Just. & Behav. 
20, 23-24, 27 (1999); Jon Sorensen & Robert D. Wrinkle, No 
Hope for Parole:  Disciplinary Infractions among Death-
Sentenced and Life-Without-Parole Inmates, 23 Crim. Just. & 
Behav. 542, 549-50 (1996).  
 
 As one analysis concluded, “An expectation then that 
death row inmates will invariably commit assaults in prison 
because they have ‘nothing to lose’ appears to be unfounded.”  
Mark D. Cunningham & Mark P. Vigen, Death Row Inmate 
Characteristics, Adjustment, and Confinement:  A Critical 
Review of the Literature, 20 Behav. Sci. & L. 191, 203 
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 The review that we found adequate in Shoats is not an 
inconvenient ritual intended to shelter officials from liability 
so that they may mechanically continue an inmate’s 
confinement on death row after a sentence of death has been 
vacated without fear of sanction.  Rather, such inmates have a 
right to regular and meaningful review of their continued 
placement on death row.181  In conjunction with periodic 
review, to ensure the review is meaningful, this process must 
include a statement of reasons for the continued placement on 
death row.182  Inmates must also have a meaningful 
opportunity to respond to the reasons provided.183  These 
procedures would be of little value absent the attendant right 
                                                                                                     
(2002).  This conclusion may well apply here, where the 
vacatur of Plaintiffs’ death sentences made life theirs to lose.  
This is precisely why an individualized assessment of the 
necessity of continued confinement of inmates like Plaintiffs 
on death row by the prison PRC is so necessary.  
181 See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983) (“Of 
course, administrative segregation may not be used as a 
pretext for indefinite confinement of an inmate.  Prison 
officials must engage in some sort of periodic review of the 
confinement of such inmates.” (emphasis added)), overruled 
on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472. 
182 See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 226 (“If the recommendation is 
[solitary] placement, Ohio requires that the decisionmaker 
provide a short statement of reasons.  This requirement 
guards against arbitrary decisionmaking while also providing 
the inmate a basis for objection before the next decisionmaker 
or in a subsequent classification review.”); see also JA at 97 
¶4. 
183 See JA at 99 ¶6. 
59 
 
of a hearing.184  Without such protections, the Constitution’s 
guarantee of due process would be “a tale . . . full of sound 
and fury, signifying nothing.”185  As Justice Kennedy has 
explained, this would leave individuals vulnerable to 
erroneous and unjustifiable infliction of “[y]ears on end of 
near-total isolation” at “a terrible price.”186 
 
VI. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
courts’ orders granting summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants based on qualified immunity.  We also hold that it 
is now clearly established that inmates on death row whose 
death sentences have been vacated have a due process right to 
avoid continued placement in solitary confinement on death 
row, absent the kind of meaningful protections discussed 
herein.  
                                              
184 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974). 
185 William Shakespeare, Macbeth, act V, sc. V. 
186 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
